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Abstract
All business transactions as well as achieving innovations take up resources, subsumed
under the concept of transaction costs. One of the major factors in transaction costs the-
ory is information. Firm networks can catalyse the interpersonal information exchange
and hence, increase the access to non-public information so that transaction costs are re-
duced. Many resources that are sacrificed for transaction costs are inputs that also enter
the technical production process. As most production data do not distinguish between
these two usages of inputs, high transaction costs result in reduced observed productivity.
We empirically analyse the effect of networks on productivity using a cross-validated local
linear non-parametric regression technique and a data set of 384 farms in Poland. Our em-
pirical study generally supports our hypothesis that networks affect productivity. Large
and dense trading networks and dense information networks and household networks have
a positive impact on a farm’s productivity. A bootstrapping procedure confirms that this
result is statistically significant.
Keywords: Information networks, Transaction Costs, Non-parametric estimation, Pro-
ductivity analysis
JEL codes: D22, D23, D24, L14, Q12
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1 Introduction
All business transactions as well as achieving innovations take up resources, subsumed
under the concept of transaction costs (Williamson, 2000; Castilla et al, 2000). One
major determinant in the reduction of transaction costs is access to information.
Networks can provide access to information that can reduce transaction costs (Henning
et al, 2012). Access to information and consequently the impact of networks on firm
performance depends on the firm’s position in the network, i.e. a firm’s position in the
network impacts its access to information which in turn reduces transaction costs.
Firms sacrifice many resources for transactions that also enter into production, e.g.
labour time, vehicles and fuel for searching information. The problem is that most pro-
duction data do not distinguish between resources dedicated to transaction costs and
resources entering production. In this case, input data are biased upwards resulting in
firms that appear less productive than their technical production process otherwise indi-
cates. Consequently, firms that, all else equal, access information via beneficiary network
positions will spend fewer resources and seem more productive.
Employing detailed production data from a survey of 384 Polish farms, we estimate
the effect of a farm’s network position on its productivity, whilst controlling for other
relevant factors, e.g. education, job experience, and location. We measure the farm’s
network position by calculating structural measures of the farm’s ego-centred networks
(e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.42). To avoid specifying a parametric functional
form of the unknown relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent
variable, we use a cross-validated local-linear non-parametric regression to estimate the
impact of the network structure on productivity.
The paper is structured as follows: section two gives a brief overview of the concept of
networks and transaction costs based on earlier studies; section three develops a simple
microeconomic model to demonstrate our case; section four and five describe the econo-
metric approach and the data, as well as the results of the analysis, respectively. Finally,
section six concludes.
2 Information networks and transaction costs
Traditional neoclassical economics assumes that the exchange of goods and the search for
information is costless so that—in this respect—markets are efficient and always provide
goods at the lowest possible price. However, more than 75 years ago, Coase (1937) argued
in his essay “The Nature of the Firm” that market transactions often involve higher costs
than just the market price. Other costs (e.g. search and information costs, bargaining
costs, and policing and enforcement costs) can increase the costs of procuring something
from a market.
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Transaction costs can be divided into two main categories: technological transaction
costs and institutional transaction costs (Green and Sheshinski, 1975). Institutional trans-
action costs include search, negotiation, and control costs, while technological transaction
costs can be separated into innovation transaction costs and physical transportation costs.
Institutional transaction costs can occur at three different stages of the transaction:
i) contact phase, ii) contracting phase, and iii) control phase (den Butter and Mosch,
2003).
In the contact phase of a potential transaction, the actor is looking for information
on trade partners, information on non-observable quality characteristics of her preferred
product, and prices of the product (either seller or buyer prices). These searching costs
occur because the search for information is not free, nor is information always complete,
reliable, or easily accessible (e.g Akerlof, 1970). Searching costs are reduced if information
is more easily accessible. Well functioning networks can provide their members with
information on business opportunities by providing cheap access to the above mentioned
information (Granovetter, 1983; Dekker, 2001; Henning and Zuckerman, 2006), whilst
as a further benefit, they increase the reliability of the information. In fact, with more
information available in the network, and with easier transfers to all interested members,
the probability that the information is of high quality increases, i.e. the information can
be trusted to be relevant and true (Casson, 1997; Fafchamps, 2001). Based on the theory
of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), Montgomery (1992) demonstrates that weak ties are
positively related to higher wages and higher aggregate employment rates. Actors with
many loose ties (gatekeepers) are superior regarding access to reliable information on
market opportunities and perform better on the market.
The contract phase starts when two trade partners agree to make a deal, in this phase
transaction costs take the form of negotiation costs. Both partners have to agree on how
to divide potential rents from trade (Braun and Gautschi, 2000). Because of bounded
rationality, a perfect contract that accounts for all eventualities is unachievable. First,
not all arrangements are verifiable by third parties (verification problem). Second, many
eventualities cannot be foreseen (environmental and behavioural uncertainty). The higher
the ex ante trust level between trading partners, the lower is the need to negotiate every
detail of the transaction (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Uzzi, 1996). Hence, the ex
ante trust level can considerably reduce negotiation costs (Nee, 1998; Fafchamps, 2001).
Rooks et al (2000) showed, in a vignette study, that socially well embedded transactions
led a purchase manager to put less effort into the management of a transaction. In total,
less time was invested in the transaction and fewer departments were involved when the
ex ante trust level was high because of social embeddedness, which included temporal,
network, and institutional embeddedness. The study shows that network embeddedness
has a significant influence and reduces the amount of resources invested in a transaction.
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Finally, if contracts are signed, the control phase starts. This consists of monitoring
and enforcing the contract. Both actions can involve many resources and can induce
high transaction costs. The first step is the monitoring of the partner to ensure that
she meets the arrangement manifested in the contract. If one of the partners behaves
opportunistically by not keeping to the agreements, the next step is enforcement of the
contract. In most cases, legal procedures are troublesome, expensive, and of long duration.
Informal punishment systems, such as the loss of a good reputation or exclusion from
future trade possibilities (Kandori, 1992; Greif, 1994; Buskens, 1998), can reduce the
costs of contract monitoring and enforcement (Ménard, 2000; Rooks et al, 2000). The
better these informal mechanisms work, the lower the incentive to defect in a transaction
and, hence, the lower the monitoring and enforcement costs (Buskens, 1999; Richman,
2006).
Innovation transaction costs refer to resources which are sacrificed to gather reliable
information on novelties and innovative production methods and processes. Although
information on innovations is accessible via public resources such as consulting or pro-
fessional journals, a considerable amount of information is private (e.g. a competitor’s
experience with a new production method).
However, this does not mean that private information is completely unavailable. Man-
agers might have close business partners and social contacts who possess this information
and are willing to share it. Hence, the quality and quantity of relationships with other
professionals and the relevance of these partners may have an important impact on a firm’s
innovation transaction costs (Castilla et al, 2000). It is quite straightforward that net-
works which allow this information to spread among entrepreneurs can have a significant
impact on the productivity of the entities that have better access to the network, i.e. have
better access to reliable non-public information about innovative production methods and
processes (Jenssen and Koenig, 2002).
These examples show that a driving force which explains the level of transaction costs
that a firm faces is information (Greif, 1994; Noorderhaven, 1996; Calvert, 1995; Levi,
2000). Both institutional as well as innovation transaction costs are therefore materially
dependent on access to information. As shown above, networks can provide an efficient
and opportune way of gathering especially non-publicly available information (e.g. Gra-
novetter, 1983; Raub and Weesie, 1990; Moschandreas, 1997; Buskens, 1999; Burt, 2001;
den Butter and Mosch, 2003; Wiebusch et al, 2004).
As the structure of personal and interpersonal networks differs, the ability to gather
information via networks may be limited for some firms and may be amplified for oth-
ers depending on their individual situation in a network (Buskens, 1999). Hence, the
individual network position should have an effect on a firm’s transaction costs.
The question remains which network structures are beneficial regarding the reduction
of transaction costs. Apart from physical transportation which is only determined by
5
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local distance and infrastructure, all sources of transaction costs—searching, negotiation,
control, and innovation costs—are related to networks. The difficulty that arises is that
some structures which might be beneficial for one kind of transaction cost might be disad-
vantageous to others. The literature is not clear-cut on the effects of network structures
on certain problems.
Beginning with searching costs, the literature suggests that beneficiary network struc-
tures are characterised by weak ties, i.e. a high number of loose contacts. In the case
of negotiation and enforcement costs on the other hand, the literature states that they
benefit from strong social control as a consequence of tight networks, i.e. networks with
high density. The closure argument (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990) states that dense
networks increase social control, develop common norms, and provide the possibility of
punishment in the case of misbehaviour. Thus, dense networks supply their members
with high levels of trust and reliable information. This hypothesis is supported by a sim-
ulation study by Buskens (1998) which shows that the level of trust increases with both
the number of contacts and density. But in cases where trust is low on the dyadic level,
the importance of density exceeds the influence of contact numbers.
Contrary to the closure argument, the gossip argument (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 2001)
states that high density is not necessarily beneficial to increase the level of trust and
can in fact reduce the reliability of the available information. The argument is that
networks affected by the gossip effect show a tendency to self-enforcing exaggeration,
which leads to very extreme positions about other actors, i.e. actors are characterised
being either extremely reliable or extremely unreliable. Burt (2001) and Dekker (2001)
provide empirical evidence that very dense networks are dominated by the gossip effect
and reveal lower trust levels than less dense networks.
Finally, in the case of innovation costs—as in the case of search costs—Granovetter
(1983) states that weak ties are the key to innovation diffusion. Loose ties between the
firm’s clustered core networks increase the diffusion of relevant information on innovation.
According to Granovetter (1983), actors that are enclosed in a tight and locked-in network
have no or minimised access to “new” information and lag behind when it comes to
innovative production technology, while actors with many and loose contacts benefit from
increased access to “new” information. Although Granovetter’s theory is straightforward,
empirical evidence is not definite. In a study among Norwegian entrepreneurs, Jenssen and
Koenig (2002) find no empirical evidence to support the theory of weak ties. Contrary to
what might be expected, Jenssen and Koenig (2002) show that strong ties are important
channels for information and can influence entrepreneurial success.
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3 Microeconomic Foundation
We assume that a firm uses a vector of n input quantities x = (x1, . . . , xn)′ to produce
the output quantity y, where the transformation of the inputs into the output can be
described by the production function
y = f(x, T ) (1)
and depends on the state of the technology T .1
3.1 Production technology and innovation
We assume that the firm can use resources to improve its production technology T , where
these resources can be of the same type as the inputs used for the production (e.g. labour,
office supplies, IT technology, fuel). We denote these resources by x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n)′, where
the elements of x¯ correspond to the elements of x2 so that we can calculate the total input
quantities that the firm uses for production and for improving the production technology
by x∗ = x + x¯. Furthermore, the firm can utilise its network to improve its production
technology by gathering information from peers, which is otherwise difficult or costly to
obtain or even unavailable. We assume that these relationships can be described by the
function
T = k(x¯, z, u), (2)
where z is a vector of network parameters characterising the firm’s networks and u is a
vector of other factors that might affect the firm’s state of technology (e.g. the education
of the management). Substituting the function in (2) for T in equation (1), we get
y = f(x, k(x¯, z, u)) ≡ f ∗(x, x¯, z, u). (3)
With respect to resources used for both production and the improvement of the production
technology, data sets that are used for estimating production functions generally do not
separate between input quantities used for the actual production and input quantities
used to improve the production technology. Therefore, the following approximation is
necessary for empirical applications:
y = f ∗(x, x¯, z, u) ≈ fˆ ∗(x + x¯, z, u) = fˆ ∗(x∗, z, u). (4)
1The following derivations can also be calculated for multiple outputs, but for simplicity we only use a
single output here.
2Of course, some elements of x¯ might be zero (e.g. raw materials). If some inputs are only used for
improving the technology, but not in the actual production (e.g. advisory services or consulting), we
can add further elements to the vector x and set these elements to zero.
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3.2 Transaction costs in trade
In addition to the resources required for the production x and for improving the produc-
tion technology x¯, the firm needs further resources for trading goods, i.e. purchasing the
inputs and selling the output. These resources can be of the same type as the inputs
used for production (e.g. labour, capital, office supplies, IT technology, fuel). We denote
the vector of resources used for trading goods by x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n)′, where the elements of
x˜ correspond to the elements of x, x¯, and x∗.3 Hence, we can calculate the total input
quantities that the firm acquires to produce the output, improve the production technol-
ogy, and to trade the goods by x∗∗ = x∗ + x˜ = x + x¯ + x˜. We expect that the quantities
of the resources required for trading goods depend on the quantities of the traded goods.
Furthermore, our considerations in the previous section suggest that good networks can
reduce the input quantities that are sacrificed for trading goods (x˜). We assume that the
above mentioned relationships can be described by the (implicit) functions
x˜i = gi(x∗∗, y, z, v) ∀ i, (5)
where z is—again—the vector of network parameters and v is a vector of other factors
that might influence the resources required to trade the goods (e.g. heterogeneity of goods,
distance to potential sellers and buyers). Now, we rearrange the above system to get a
system of implicit functions for x∗
x∗∗i − x∗i = gi(x∗∗, y, z, v) ∀ i (6)
x∗i = x∗∗i − gi(x∗∗, fˆ ∗(x∗, z, u), z, v) ∀ i (7)
x∗i ≡ g∗i (x∗∗, x∗, z, u, v) ∀ i, (8)
which we can solve to get a system of explicit functions for x∗
x∗i ≡ hi(x∗∗, z, u, v) ∀ i. (9)
Substituting these functions for x∗ in the production function that accounts for activities
to improve the production technology (4), we get
y = fˆ ∗(h(x∗∗, z, u, v), z, u) ≡ fˆ ∗∗(x∗∗, z, u, v). (10)
As data sets generally do not separate input quantities that are used for the actual pro-
duction, for improving the production technology, and for trading goods into these three
parts, production economists usually do not estimate the real production function f(x),
but an augmented production function fˆ ∗∗(x∗∗, z, u, v) that not only includes the pro-
3Of course, some elements of x˜ might be zero (e.g. raw materials).
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duction process, but also the trading of goods and activities to improve the production
technology. Hence, transaction costs and innovation costs are usually included in the esti-
mated production technology. According to our assumptions, firms with better networks
need less resources for trading goods and can improve their production technology more
easily and at less cost (see discussion in the previous section). Hence, these firms should be
able to produce the same amount of output (y) with smaller (total) input quantities (x∗∗),
i.e. they should appear to be more productive.
4 Model and Data
If our considerations about transaction costs and networks are correct and we use a typical
data set, where the input quantities include resources used for the production x, resources
used to improve the production technology x¯, and resources used for trading goods x˜, the
production function should not only depend on the input quantities, but also on the firm’s
network position. Hence, we can test the hypothesis that networks influence transaction
costs by estimating the augmented production function fˆ ∗∗(x∗∗, z, u, v) defined in (10) and
testing if the network parameters z have a significant influence.
Given our microeconomic model derived above, the relationship between the total in-
put quantities x∗∗, the network parameters z, the other factors u and v, and the output
quantity y is unknown and could be rather complex. To avoid specifying a parametric
functional form, we estimate this augmented production function by a non-parametric
regression technique.4 We apply the non-parametric local-linear estimation method for
both continuous and categorical explanatory variables described in Li and Racine (2004)
and Racine and Li (2004), where the second-order Epanechnikov kernel is used for con-
tinuous regressors, the kernel proposed by Aitchison and Aitken (1976, p. 29) is used for
unordered categorical explanatory variables, and the kernel proposed by Wang and van
Ryzin (1981) is used for ordered categorical explanatory variables. We make the frequently
used assumption that the bandwidths can differ between regressors but are constant over
the domain of each regressor. The bandwidths of the regressors are selected according to
the expected Kullback-Leibler cross-validation criterion (Hurvich et al, 1998). The esti-
mation was performed within the statistical software environment “R” (R Development
Core Team, 2009) using the add-on package “np” (Hayfield and Racine, 2008).
4We estimated the augmented production function also using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) with
the model specification of Battese and Coelli (1995), where we assumed that the network parameters
influence the firm’s (in)efficiency. The results were rather similar, but the SFA approach generally re-
turned higher marginal significance levels (smaller P -values) of the regressors than the non-parametric
approach. Since the marginal significance levels of the SFA are probably incorrect due to erroneous
assumptions about the parametric specification (translog function for the total input quantities x∗∗;
random errors follow a normal distribution; error terms of the inefficiency model follow a truncated
normal distribution, where the effect of the network parameters on the expected inefficiency is linear),
we decided to only present the results of the non-parametric analysis.
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In our empirical analysis, we use a data set of 384 Polish farms. The data were col-
lected within the framework of the “Advanced-Eval” project financed by the European
Union within the Sixth Framework Programme. The data set includes detailed farm ac-
countancy data and information on the farms’ ego-centred networks. We take the total
value of all produced goods as output (in Zloty) and we distinguish between four inputs:
labour (in working hours), land (in ha), capital (in Zloty), and intermediate inputs (in
Zloty), where the last category mainly consists of seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, purchased
feed, fuel, and electricity. We take the logarithm of the output and all the input quan-
tities so that the individual values of these variables are more equally distributed within
the range of observed values. If we did not do this, there would be many observations
within the bandwidths for small values (farms), but only very few observations within
the bandwidth for large values (farms), which usually causes problems in non-parametric
regression with fixed (constant) bandwidths. Furthermore, the unknown true augmented
production function is likely more similar to a log-linear (Cobb-Douglas) function than to
a linear function (which implies perfect substitutability between inputs) so that the use of
logarithmic quantities of the inputs and the output allows for larger bandwidths, which in
turn increases the precision of the local-linear estimates, because the observation-specific
marginal effects are based on a larger number of observations (Czekaj and Henningsen,
2013).
Since Polish farms usually have a single farm manager, we do not have to model intra-
firm networks, which can play an important role in information diffusion. Hence, our
data set has the advantage that we can neglect intra-firm networks when modelling net-
works. We apply two common network parameters for ego-centred networks to model
the structure of the farms’ networks, namely the number of outdegrees and the density
of the network. The first network parameter refers to the total number of contacts n
(alteri) that an ego—in our case the farm—has. The second network parameter, density,
describes the degree of interconnectedness between ego’s alteri, h /[m(m− 1)/2] , where h
is the actual number of ties between the alteri and m(m− 1)/2 is the number of possible
ties.
The variables that might affect the firm’s state of technology (u) include management
characteristics, namely level of education (ordered categorical variable), work experience
(in years) and attitude to risk. The latter is the average response to several questions
about risk attitude, where larger positive values indicate higher risk aversion.
The region in which the farm is located (unordered categorical variable) is the only vari-
able in our data set that might influence the resources required to trade the goods (v).
Our data include farms from four different municipalities (Gminas). The municipalities
Chotcza and Wieliszew are located close to urban areas, while Siemiątkowo and Kamieniec
are located in remote areas. While Wieliszew and Kamieniec perform well economically,
Chotcza and Siemiątkowo’s economic performance is weak. Hence, the four municipalities
10
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cover all possible combinations of location and economic performance. Of course, this re-
gional variable also accounts for differences in climate and soil, but we cannot differentiate
between these effects. Whilst a separation of these effects would be interesting, it is not
essential for our study.
5 Results
Table 1 presents the cross-validated bandwidths of the explanatory variables that we
obtained by the method of Hurvich et al (1998). Initially, our model also included
the farmer’s education and his or her risk attitudes as explanatory variables but we
removed these explanatory variables, because the bootstrapping method suggested by
Racine (1997) and Racine et al (2006) indicated that these variables do not have a statis-
tically significant effect. The bandwidths of the continuous explanatory variables are very
large, which indicates that the relationship between these independent variables and the
dependent variable is approximately linear. However, in contrast to a parametric linear
regression (e.g. OLS), our non-parametric regression with large bandwidths still allows
the marginal effects of the explanatory variables to differ between observations.
Table 1: Cross-validated bandwidths of the explanatory variables
Variable Bandwidth Scale Factor
lLabor 39601 99902
lLand 39602 70049
lCapital 271441 365861
lIntermed 710646 964351
exper 21571641 2897965
municip 0.500 1.006
outdTrade 4870849 4852258
densTrade 982087 4863543
outdInf 982088 2289227
densInf 271441 3063498
outdSoc 878408 2742619
densSoc 952187 9313730
outdHH 3428765 3477267
densHH 424369 1385528
The marginal effects (gradients) of the independent variable with respect to the ex-
planatory variables are summarised in Table 2. This table also shows the marginal signif-
icance levels (P-values) of the explanatory variables that we obtained by the bootstrapping
method suggested by Racine (1997) and Racine et al (2006) (see also Hayfield and Racine,
2008, p. 9).
All input quantities (lLabor, lLand, lCapital, lIntermed) have a positive effect on
the output quantity at all observations. Hence, the monotonicity condition derived from
11
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Table 2: Marginal effects and statistical significance of the explanatory variables
Variable Min Mean Median Max P value
lLabor 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.00 ***
lLand 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.00 ***
lCapital 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.00 ***
lIntermed 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.00 ***
sum: all inputs 1.12 1.16 1.15 1.24
exper -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.04 *
municip: chot → kami -0.35 0.19 0.22 0.54
municip: chot → siem -0.28 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.03 *
municip: chot → wiel -0.08 0.10 0.10 0.32
outdTrade 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.00 ***
densTrade 0.06 0.32 0.44 0.47 0.04 *
outdInf 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.95
densInf 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.07 .
outdSoc -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.66
densSoc -0.52 -0.47 -0.47 -0.41 0.31
outdHH 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.24
densHH 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.00 ***
microeconomic production theory is fulfilled in our analysis even though the input quan-
tities include transaction costs. As all input and output quantities are logarithmised, the
marginal effects can be interpreted as partial production elasticities of the inputs. How-
ever, in contrast to their usual definition, they not only account for the actual production
process but also for activities for improving technology and trading goods. Intermediate
inputs have the largest marginal effects on output, while the marginal effects of the other
three inputs are somewhat smaller. The elasticities of scale, which are equal to the sums
over the four partial production elasticities, range from 1.09 to 1.17, which indicates that
all farms operate under increasing returns to scale.
The effect of the farm manager’s experience (exper) on the output is negative for
most farms, where each year of experience can reduce the output by a maximum of 1%.
The marginal effects of the municipalities (municip) describe the expected differences
in output that are due to farms being located in different municipalities. We take the
municipality Chotcza (chot) as the base for our comparison. Farms that are located in the
municipality Siemiątkowo (siem) need on average roughly as many resources for improving
technology, trading goods, and producing the same output as farms in the municipality
Chotcza. In contrast, farms that are located in the municipalities Kamieniec (kami) and
Wieliszew (wiel) can produce on average 19% and 10% more output, respectively, with
the same amount of input and everything else being equal. Given our model and data, we
cannot determine whether the above-mentioned effects of the management characteristics
and the farms’ location are due to differences in the production process, differences in
12
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the resources used to improve the production technology, or differences in the resources
required for trade so we only analyse the combined effect.
The number of outdegrees and the density of the farm’s trading network (outdTrade
and densTrade, respectively) have a positive and rather large effect on the productivity of
all farms. An additional contact increases the farm output on average by 15%. Increasing
the density of the farm’s trading network from zero (a totally loose network without any
connection between the alteri) to one (a totally dense network with all alteri connected)
increases the output on average by 32%.
The number of outdegrees of the farm’s information network (outdInf) does not have a
significant effect on productivity, while the effect of the density of the farm’s information
network (densInf) is large and positive but only statistically significant at the 10% level.
The farm’s social network, i.e. friendships with business partners, does not have a
statistically significant effect on the productivity.
The number of outdegrees of the household network (outdHH) does not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on the productivity. The density of the household network (densHH)
clearly increases the output of all farms. Increasing this density from zero to one would
increase the output on average by 40%.
As a complement to the marginal effects shown in table 2, we graphically illustrate the
estimation results in figure 1. While the marginal effects shown in table 2 are calculated at
all data points that are in the sample, the estimated relationships displayed in figure 1 are
calculated by holding the other explanatory variables constant at their medians (numeric
variables) or their modal values (categorical variables). Furthermore, the figure shows the
95% variability bounds obtained by bootstrapping (see Hayfield and Racine, 2008, p. 17).
The findings derived from the marginal effects shown in table 2 are confirmed in figure 1,
i.e. ceteris paribus the output monotonically increases in all inputs, slightly decreases in
experience, largely increases in the outdegrees of the trade network, and slightly increases
in the density of the trade, information and household networks, while the social network
and the number of outdegrees of the information network and the household network are
(nearly) irrelevant.
Our results confirm findings in the literature that the number of outdegrees decreases
transaction costs and increases productivity for the trade network only and not for the
other networks. This means that farmers can become more productive by increasing their
number of trading partners in order to reduce transaction costs and search costs. On the
other hand, close friendships with business partners (i.e. the social network of the farm)
have no significant effect on the productivity. This confirms the weak ties hypothesis
(Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1992), as we find that weak ties (e.g. with trading
partners) are more important than strong ties (e.g. close friendships).
The literature provides contradictory results regarding the effect of the density of the
firm’s network, Our empirical study clearly supports the closure argument (Granovetter,
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the estimation results
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1985; Coleman, 1990), as we find that the densities of three out of four networks positively
influence productivity. Our analysis does not support the gossip argument (Coleman,
1990; Burt, 2001), because the estimated marginal effects of the densities are positive
even when the density is already very high.
6 Conclusion
As most data sets do not allow a distinction to be made between inputs used for pro-
duction and resources dedicated to gather information and to trade goods, the variables
that are typically used for estimating production functions generally include technical and
institutional transaction costs. We showed that this results in estimating an “augmented”
production function that also includes the trading of goods and activities to improve the
production technology. A vast literature shows that networks can promote the gathering
of reliable information in an economical way. Our empirical study generally supports these
results. Large and dense trading networks and dense information networks and household
networks have a positive impact on a farm’s productivity. Our results support the weak
ties hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1992) and closure argument (Granovet-
ter, 1985; Coleman, 1990), but they do not support the gossip argument (Coleman, 1990;
Burt, 2001).
Still, further research should be conducted in this field, especially further empirical
studies are needed to obtain more reliable information about the coherency between net-
works and the specific types of transaction costs. Since the farming sector has some very
special characteristics (e.g. close connection between household and farm, mainly located
in rural areas which include special norms and a special culture due to small and closed
communities), the representativeness of our results is generally limited. In this context,
it would be interesting to also study other sectors to see whether the effects of networks
differ between sectors. Furthermore, future research should include more advanced net-
work parameters and additional types of networks, not just ego-centred. Finally, future
work should focus on the separation of technical transaction costs and the different forms
of institutional transaction costs. However, the last two suggestions require data that are
difficult and costly to collect.
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